The Evolution of Grain Trading Organizations in Australia: Applying the Cooperative Life Cycle by Brewin, Derek G. et al.
N u m b er   9 / 2 0 0 8 / p . 9 - 1 7   w w w . C A F RI . o rg  
 
 







The Evolution of Grain Trading Organizations 
in Australia: Applying the Cooperative Life Cycle  
Derek Brewin 
Assistant Professor, Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics,  
University of Manitoba 
Michelle Bielik 
Graduate student, Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics,  
University of Manitoba 
Brian Oleson 
Professor, Head and Agribusiness Chair in Cooperatives and Marketing, 
Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics, University of Manitoba 
The Issue 
Cook’s (1995) life cycle theory of cooperatives predicts a rise and fall of cooperatives 
over time. He argues that cooperatives arise as a response, by producers or consumers, to 
some form of inefficiency in a  market structure,  for example an oligopoly. In such a 
market, the cooperative can thrive by replacing the ineffective firms until other firms or 
institutions or technology come along and deliver even better service. When this happens, 
the  cooperative’s  ownership  and  control  features  may  hamper  its  ability  to  grow  and 
compete. According to Cook, the cooperative will eventually need to change in order to 
accommodate investors, or it will be forced to exit the market. This article considers the 
case of Australia’s grain market within Cook’s framework to see if it has behaved as 
predicted and where it is heading in terms of responding to the needs of the agents in the 
market chain. 
In the 1980s  Australia’s grain  cooperatives  and institutions faced challenges from 
deregulation  and  changing  market  structure  that  exposed  extensive  inefficiency  in  the 
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traditional  cooperative  ownership  arrangements.  This  article  will  review  the  origins, 
successes and eventual transformation of Australia’s major grain marketing institutions. 
Implications and Conclusions 
Australia offers evidence to support the Cook model. Compulsory handling and outdated 
regulations  led  to  significant  inefficiency  in  Australia’s  grain  handling  and  marketing 
sector by the 1970s and 1980s. These inefficiencies were exposed by internal reviews 
following  a  popular  wave  of  deregulation  in  Australian  industry,  but  traditional 
cooperative ownership became problematic in addressing the needs of the market. 
The removal of various pieces of compulsory delivery legislation and improvements 
in the coordination of grain handling led to major opportunities for the once protected 
bulk handling authorities of the Australian grain sector. As they began to compete with 
one  another,  the  limitations  of  the  traditional  cooperative  ownership  structure  led  to 
various investor benefit sharing schemes, exactly as Cook had predicted. 
The implications of this example are numerous. As cooperative firms adjust to new 
environments around the world, the example of Australia’s grain sector illustrates that the 
traditional  cooperative  may  need  to  consider  some  form  of  transformation  to  include 
investor sharing in order to survive in the long run. 
Background 
This article uses Cook’s framework of evolving cooperatives to consider the institutions 
and  firms  of  Australia’s  grain  industry.  He  suggested  that  cooperatives  begin  by 
addressing legitimate market failure and offer valuable services to their patron members. 
As technology and competition change the total costs of these services, the cooperative 
can be limited by poor access to capital linked to the traditional structure of a cooperative. 
The cooperative then goes through a self-examination facilitated by efficiencies observed 
in other firms, including investor-oriented firms (IOFs). Cook’s framework will be further 
explained  in  a  following  section.  First,  however,  we  need  to  consider  the  nature  of 
Australia’s  grain  sector  and  the  origins  of  the  various  institutions  considered  in  this 
analysis. 
Australia’s Grain Sector 
Wheat and barley are the dominant crops grown by Australian farmers. They account for 
75 percent of all harvested area (ABARE, 2007). The dominance of wheat and barley led 
to a historical focus on the marketing and handling of these grains. Climate conditions led 
to  significant  variation  in  the  level  of  production.  The  total  wheat  crop  has  ranged 
between 10 and 25 million tonnes over the last several decades (USDA – FAS, 2007).  
The  region  of  Australia  that  produces  wheat  and  barley  is  commonly  called  the 
“wheat-sheep zone”. It is a fairly narrow band near the southern coast of Australia, with 
approximately  35  percent  of  the  wheat  production  happening  in  the  state  of  Western Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  D. Brewin, M. Bielik and B. Oleson 
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Australia  and  the  rest  happening  in  the  southeast.  Western  Australia,  with  a  lower 
domestic population, also tends to export more than the eastern states (ABARE, 2007). 
Australia exported around 16 million tonnes of wheat in the 2005/2006 crop year from a 
crop  of  25  million  tonnes.  That  was  around  14  percent  of  all  wheat  exported  to 
international markets (USDA – WADSE, 2007). 
Compared  to  other  major  grain  exporters  like  Canada  and  the  United  States, 
Australian rail transportation is not as extensive. In numerous parts of Australia it is less 
efficient to move grain to port by rail than by truck (Fisher and Rose, 2006). Australian 
farmers also tend to truck their grain to local silos or strategic commercial sites directly 
from the harvested field, avoiding on-farm storage.  
Despite some of the differences mentioned, Australia has gone through many of the 
same  changes  other  major  grain  exporters  have  gone  through.  The  number  of  grain 
farmers has been falling. Between 1978 and 2002 the number of grain farmers in Australia 
fell by a third (Hooper, Barret and Martin, 2003). Deregulation in handling has led to 
major scale economies. Since deregulation, the Australian Wheat Board Limited, a major 
domestic shipper, has lowered rail costs by 25 percent at some sites (Fisher and Rose, 
2006). 
Australia’s Institutions 
Australia’s statutory institutions evolved from early 20th century efforts by growers to 
form marketing cooperatives (Productivity Commission, 2000). At the time, growers were 
concerned  with  middlemen  profiteering  and  unstable  prices  (Piggott,  1990).  These 
cooperatives were designed to cheaply move farmers’ grain to export positions and, using 
terms of trade, support prices. Because of troubles with free riders in pooling, farmers 
lobbied the Australian government to make grower  participation in these cooperatives 
compulsory. Various cooperatives were given statutory powers to make delivery to these 
grain  handlers  compulsory;  also,  the  government  created  some  statutory  bulk  grain 
handlers at this time. The grower orientation led to a particular feeling of entitlement 
regarding these grain handling institutions. A.S. Watson (1999) describes this perception:  
Farmers do not see themselves as purchasers of marketing services from 
statutory marketing authorities in the same way as marketing services or 
inputs are purchased from private firms. Instead, farmers regard statutory 
marketing  authorities  as  operating  on  their  behalf….  The  creation  of 
statutory marketing authorities reflected fears in the farming community 
concerning  the  efficiency  and  conduct  of  agricultural  marketing…. 
[They] cannot be thought of as merely marketing institutions.  
Orderly  marketing  through  a  “single  desk”  in  charge  of  all  export  sales  was 
implemented through the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) first during World War I and 
then reestablished permanently in 1938. Since that time the AWB managed a compulsory 
pooling scheme as well as government guaranteed pricing arrangements (Whitwell, 1993).  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  D. Brewin, M. Bielik and B. Oleson 
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Unlike Canada and the United States, Australia’s handling system never developed 
using on-farm storage with periodic deliveries to the handling system over the crop year. 
At least partially due to government support, large bulk handling authorities eventually 
took over the tasks of initial storage and further handling of grain in Australia (Whitwell 
and Sydenham, 1991). When initial utilization of the government-sponsored bulk handlers 
was poor, delivery to these handlers was made compulsory. State-owned bulk handlers or 
cooperatives  with  exclusive  statutory  powers  were  established  in  all  the  major  grain-
growing states of Australia, starting with New South Wales in the 1930s and ending with 
South Australia and Queensland in the 1950s. These authorities were highly regulated. 
Most  of  them  were  controlled  by  governing  boards  with  grower  majorities,  many  of 
whom forced various versions of equity of access to facilities and of equality in returns to 
farmers that ignored commercial returns (Whitwell and Sydenham, 1991). 
Grain transportation was also highly regulated for Australian grains, with limitations 
on road transportation in favour of state rail authorities (Royal Commission into Grain 
Storage,  Handling  and  Transport,  1988).  Coordination  problems  between  state  rail 
authorities, including rail gauge variations, led, in some cases, to inefficient movement to 
port (Cracknell and Sing, 2000). It is still cheaper, by 6.7 Australian dollars per tonne, to 
move grain to port by road than rail in parts of New South Wales (Fisher and Rose, 2006). 
Deregulation 
In 1988 Australia’s Industry Assistance Commission, which had been pushing for more 
flexibility in wheat marketing since 1978, suggested the removal of the AWB’s export 
single  desk  authority.  Trevor  Flugge,  president  of  the  Australian  Wheatgrowers 
Federation  in  1983,  favoured  deregulation  of  the  Australian  domestic  grain  handling 
system. He later became chairman of the AWB (Whitwell and Sydenham, 1991). 
The pressure of a general push for deregulation across Australia’s industrial base and 
looming  economies  of  scale  in  the  handling  sector  led  to  the  passage  of  the  Wheat 
Marketing Act in 1989 by the Australian parliament (Ireland, 1998). The act deregulated 
compulsory acquisition powers for the bulk handlers; established a Wheat Industry Fund 
for use by the AWB; included cost minimization as part of the AWB’s mandate; permitted 
the AWB to buy other grains and acquire facilities; and put a sunset clause on the single 
desk authority. Overall, the passage of the act represented a move away from regulation of 
the Australian grains sector and created an impetus for the AWB and the bulk handling 
authorities to become more commercially responsive (Ryan, 1994). 
Cooperatives 
Any discussion of cooperatives must clarify how the word “cooperative” is being applied. 
In  Australia  various  firms  and  institutions  arose  to  handle  grain  due  to  the  political 
support  of  farmers  in  the  early  1900s  (Bielik,  2004).  Some  of  them  were  traditional 
cooperatives that were later given further power from regulators. Other institutions were 
formed  when the government identified a market failure in bulk handling and created Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  D. Brewin, M. Bielik and B. Oleson 
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cooperative  institutions  controlled  by  their  patrons  with  the  objective  of  offering 
favourable services to their users. The wide range in the possible structures of control and 
ownership leads to some confusion in the discussion of cooperatives. Chaddad and Cook 
(2002) suggested the “traditional cooperative” was owned only by patron members, with 
non-transferable, non-proportional capital investment and no benefits shared with outside 
investors. By this definition all of the original statutory bulk handling authorities were 
cooperatives. 
Model of a Cooperative 
The goal of this article is to review evolution of Australia’s grain handling institutions as 
possible illustrations of the life cycle of cooperatives. Cook (1995) and Harte (1997) were 
the first to suggest that any cooperative faced a predictable pattern of challenges when 
markets changed and that this often led to reform of the cooperative or its exit from the 
market. Cook’s framework of the life cycle of cooperatives was separated into five steps, 
shown here in table 1. In the first stage, various types of market failure in the supply chain 
and local user support lead to the formation of a cooperative. It is basically a defensive 
reaction by the cooperative patrons to some imbalance in their market. 
In the second stage, a new cooperative operates successfully in a market that had been 
troubled by some type of market failure, often due to an oligopoly or oligopsony from 
investor-oriented firms (IOFs). As the IOFs or the market in general adjust to the new 
Table 1  Cook’s (1995) 5-stage Cooperative Life Cycle Model 
Stage one: 
A cooperative is formed as a response to market failure: individual producers act 
collectively. 
Cooperative’s strategy is defensive in nature. 
Stage two:  The cooperative provides net benefits by marketing products or providing services 
on more favourable terms than original IOFs, olgopolists or oligopsonists. 
Stage three: 
The market changes and cooperative benefits relative to IOFs are less certain. 
Focus turns inward to examine cooperative’s own transaction costs, especially 
free rider, horizon, portfolio, control and influence cost problems. 
Stage four: 
Managing the cooperative becomes exceedingly difficult and cooperative leaders 
consider strategic alternatives: exit, continue or transition to new ownership 
structure. 
Stage five: 
The cooperative leaders implement a new strategy: 
1) exit by liquidating, merging or converting to IOF; 
2) continue but address tendency to undercapitalize by a) seeking outside equity 
without complete restructure to IOF or b) pursuing proportionality strategy of 
internally generated capital; 
3) transition into a new generation cooperative. 
Cooperative more offensive in nature. 
Source: Adapted from Cook (1995) and Beilik (2004) Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  D. Brewin, M. Bielik and B. Oleson 
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balance of power, the original cooperative moves into Cook’s stage three, and the benefits 
of  the  cooperative  from  the  rebalance  start  to  be  offset  by  institutional  problems 
associated with the traditional cooperative structure. 
Cook,  and  other  researchers  like  Harte  (1997)  and  Fulton  and  Gibbings  (2000), 
suggested that one of the key areas of concern in cooperative development was the control 
of residual equity value. A lack of clearly defined property rights and a market for the 
transfer of those rights led to capital constraints as the market changed or as the pool of 
patrons became more heterogeneous. These researchers suggested transformation of the 
traditional cooperative to facilitate capital needs. Chaddad and Cook (2002) differentiated 
among these new entities by the ways in which they addressed the ownership problems 
identified in Cook’s five-stage life cycle of a cooperative. New generation cooperatives 
have  non-redeemable  but  transferable  ownership,  member-investor  cooperatives  have 
benefit  sharing  arrangements  with  investors,  and  proportional-investment  cooperatives 
distribute earnings proportional to shares, which may be forced on patrons through links 
to patronage, but the earnings encourage capital supplies. 
It  is  in  stage  three  of  Cook’s  model  that  the  cooperative  encounters  costs  not 
encountered  by  their  competitor  IOFs.  These  costs  include  problems  associated  with 
property rights, including a free rider problem, when individuals inside and outside the 
cooperative benefit from costs paid unequally by others; a horizon problem, when the 
return generated to a member owner is over a shorter period than the productive life of a 
purchased asset; a portfolio problem due to differences between the risk-return profile of 
an individual patron and that of the cooperative as a whole; a control problem between the 
management of a cooperative and its owner members that lacks the external pressures 
seen in IOFs with publicly traded stocks and other types of discipline; and finally an 
influence cost problem, when patrons pursue self interests in the distribution of wealth or 
benefits among members and not cost reduction or income growth (Bielik, 2004).  
When the cooperative finally recognizes its structure is problematic in terms of its 
long-term survival and changes must be made, it has entered Cook’s fourth stage. The 
leadership  convinces  the  membership  that  alternative  structures  should  be  considered, 
including the following: an exit from the market and return to IOF control, or conversion 
of the cooperative to an IOF or merger with an IOF; a restructuring of ownership and 
equity  sharing  that  includes  proportionality  devices  that  address  the  most  important 
problem identified in the current structure; or the cooperative creates a new generation 
cooperative with an asset appreciation mechanism, share liquidity, a base equity plan and 
a closed membership policy.  
Analysis 
Now  we  consider  the  evolution  of  Australia’s  major  grain  institutions  within  the 
framework of Cook’s cooperative life cycle model. Table 2 presents the analysis as an 
overview. Stage one began with the demands of stable supplies during World War I and Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  D. Brewin, M. Bielik and B. Oleson 
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with grower concerns of exploitation between the  wars.  In  Western  Australia, grower 
cooperatives emerged on their own in the form of the Westralian Farmers Cooperative and 
the Western Australian Wheat Pool. In Southern Australia, the South Australian Wheat 
and  Woolgrowers  Association  was  formed.  When  bulk  handling  problems  began  to 
emerge  in  the  1930s,  statutory  bulk  handling  authorities  were  created  in  each  of  the 
affected Australian states. The western cooperatives merged to become Cooperative Bulk 
Handling Limited (CBH) and were given statutory powers, including compulsory delivery 
in Western Australia. The Southern Australian Wheat and Woolgrowers Association was 
given statutory powers in that state, and it eventually transformed into AusBulk (Whitwell 
and Sydenham, 1991). 
The other institutions discussed below, the AWB, the Australian Barley Board (ABB) 
and GrainCorp Limited, originated with the support of government fiat. The AWB and 
ABB  were created to use “orderly  marketing” to capture values for farmers from the 
Table 2  The Cooperative Life Cycle Applied to the Australian Grain Sector 
Stage one: 
1920s to 1950s: 
Instability due to depression and war lead to grower fear of exploitation by 
middlemen and processors. Grower cooperatives convert quickly to “compulsory” 
marketing and handling authorities.  
Stage two: 
1950s to 1970s: 
Statutory arrangements remain in place for a significant period, with general 
grower support for perceived stability and income benefits. 
Stage three: 
1980s: 
Concerns about inefficiency in handling begin to surface. Deregulation becomes 
a popular concept in Australian parliament. Royal Commission increases 
awareness of system costs. 1989 Wheat Marketing Act deregulates domestic 
grain handling and threatens export monopoly. 
Stage four: 
1990s: 
AWB and bulk handling authorities recognize opportunities of efficiencies, 
mergers and capital accumulation in newly deregulated market. Leaders start to 




Various new firms and institutions undertake strategies of growth and 
diversification along the supply chain. Key organizations implant structural 
changes:  
• AWB Limited and ABB Grain implement dual class share structures; 
• GrainCorp and AusBulk implement holding company structures; 
• CBH remains traditional cooperative, members reject dual class restructuring; 
• all organizations remain under grower control; 
• new shares are publicly listed. 
Source: adapted from Beilik (2004) Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  D. Brewin, M. Bielik and B. Oleson 
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export market. GrainCorp began when the Grain Elevators Board of New South Wales (a 
government body) was given statutory powers for compulsory delivery (Keen, 1998). 
Stage two, the period of successful operations, may have been shorter than the period 
listed (1950s to 1970s). Although there were twenty to thirty years of calm in the grain 
sector in Australia starting in the 1950s, little attention was given to the rising costs of 
regulated marketing and handling until the popularity of deregulation swept the country in 
the  1980s.  The  sector  might  have  been  quite  inefficient  before  then.  Stage  three,  the 
period where transaction costs are clarified and strategies to deal with them emerge, was 
not facilitated by efficient and competing IOFs as is normally the case. The costs were 
identified by observing operations in other countries and through the work of internal 
reviews, including the Royal Commission into Grain Storage, Handling and Transport in 
1988. With the support of grower leadership, the Australian parliament enacted the Wheat 
Marketing Act in 1989, allowing a wide range of options to the now deregulated bulk 
handling authorities and to the AWB and ABB, which now had some capacity to raise 
capital and buy assets. 
As predicted, in the final stages eventually all of the major Australian grain marketers 
except one transformed into investor-share cooperatives, with some grower control but 
with investors sharing in earnings to attract their capital investments. The lone holdout, 
CBH, considered restructuring in 2000 but rejected it. They have, however participated in 
various  joint  ventures  that  have  allowed  access  to  new  capital.  CBH  remains  an 
aggressive grain cooperative in Western Australia. Bielik (2004) argued that continued 
success  for  CBH  would  increase  the  pressure  from  some  members  for  eventual 
redemption of equity from shares and thus force the transformation of CBH into a new 
type  of  cooperative.  That  final  shift  has  not  yet  happened,  but  Cook’s  predictions 
regarding the evolution of Australia’s cooperative organizations were clearly prescient. 
The case of Australia’s grain marketers fully supports the dynamic model of Cook’s five-
stage life cycle of cooperatives. 
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